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Trust and violation go hand in hand in our everyday life.  However, few studies have 
directly examined the effects of violation on trust and delineated the nonlinear patterns of trust 
changes after violation.  In this research, I focused on trust dynamics in two phases after 
violation: trust dissolution and trust restoration.  Specifically, I examined how the individual 
differences of collectivistic self-construal and group identification, in conjunction with the 
situational variables of violation magnitude and trustee’s group membership (ingroup vs. 
outgroup), moderate the relationship between trust violation and changes in trust level and 
trajectory across the two phases.  The study adopted an economic game methodology—the 
Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995)—that allows repeated measures of trust.  
Results from discontinuous growth modeling indicated that the trust changes after violation, in 
dissolution and restoration, are a function of violation magnitude, collectivistic self-construal, 
ingroup and outgroup dynamics, and group identification.  Further, the dynamic patterns 
revealed a black sheep effect.  Individuals high on collectivistic self-construal and group 
identification exhibited a larger and faster trust decrease during dissolution and a slower increase 
during restoration after a large than a small ingroup violation.  High collectivists high on group 
identification also showed slower trust restoration after a large ingroup violation than high 
collectivists low on group identification.  However, the black sheep effect was absent when 
 
 
collectivists experienced an outgroup violation or were low on group identification.  Implications 
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Chapter 1. Trust Violation and Trust Dynamics 
I'm not upset that you lied to me, I'm upset that from now on I can't believe you. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche 
The act of trust implicitly allows the possibility of violations (Granovetter, 1985). 
Not surprisingly, trust violations have been shown not to be exceptions but common 
occurrences: Up to 55 percent of employees reported experiencing violation of trust in 
organizations (Hansson, Jones, & Fletcher, 1990; Jones & Burdette, 1993; Robinson & 
Rousseau, 1994). It is undeniable that the crisis of trust, declared fifteen years ago 
(Fukuyama, 1995), is a concern now more than ever. Given its prevalence, it is alarming 
that we know little about the effect of violation on trust dynamics. How exactly does 
violation change trust patterns? Does the trajectory of trust decrease vary as a function of 
violation magnitude as well as trustor’s and trustee’s characteristics?   
Understanding the impact of violation is especially important given the potentially 
enormous benefits of trust. Trust, defined as “a psychological state comprising the 
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or 
behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; p.395), has been linked 
to a myriad of constructive social-psychological outcomes. At the micro level, trust has 
been shown to facilitate interpersonal relationships (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985), 
cooperation (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002), team work (Dirks, 1999; Lawler, 1992), 
organizational commitment (Kramer, 1999), citizenship behavior (McAllister, 1995; 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990), leadership effectiveness (Dirks & 
Ferrin, 2002; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Jung & Avolio, 2000), and negotiation and 
mediation success (Arnold & O’Connor, 2006; Olekalns & Lau, 2002; Valley, Moag, & 
Bazerman, 1998). At the macro level, scholars view trust as a driving force in conflict de-
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escalation (Axelrod, 1984), a foundation for democracy (Putnam, 1993), and the key to 
national economic well-being (Fukuyama, 1995).   
Regardless of the context, trust has been conceptualized as a dynamic process that 
spans across formation, violation, and beyond. Prior research has identified at least three 
unique trust phases: formation, dissolution, and restoration (e.g., Miles & Creed, 1995; 
Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Rousseau et al., 1998). In this paper, I conceptualize trust 
formation as a progression in which individuals choose to trust others and increase their 
trust over time. Trust dissolution occurs when, after violation, individuals decide to lower 
their trust in others. Finally, Trust restoration occurs when trust stops declining after 
violation and starts to rebound, eventually being relatively stable.  
Despite the recognition of multiple trust phases, the trust literature is limited by its 
predominant focus on trust formation (e.g., Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
McKnight, Cummings, & Cummings, 1998). There has been a growing concern about the 
limited research and theory on trust after violation (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Kim et 
al., 2009; Morris & Moberg, 1994; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). While some studies have 
directly examined trust repair (e.g., Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; McCullough, 
Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; Tomlinson, 
Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004), the goal of this line of research tends to be identifying 
successful trust repair strategies. Relatively little is known about the impact of violation 
on interpersonal trust. The first goal of this study, therefore, was to uncover trust changes 
after violation, including the phases of dissolution, and restoration.  
In addition to a lack of understanding on trust dynamics post violation, prior 
research tends to be phase-specific, limited to one trust phase or one point in time 
(Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Rousseau et al., 1998). Such a narrow focus 
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provides only a snapshot of the trust relationship as it naturally progresses. Interactions 
between individuals are continuous, and isolation of a single trust phase cannot provide a 
holistic picture of how trust patterns unfold over time. For example, after a trust 
violation, trust may plummet initially but rebound with repeated, consistent interactions 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Schweitzer et al., 2006). The second goal of this study was to 
examine trust changes across multiple phases.  
 
Figure 1. Hypothetical graph showing a high trustor pattern.  
 
Figure 2. Hypothetical graph showing a high distrustor pattern.  
 
When considering multiple trust phases sequentially, different trust patterns arise. 
For example, some people (e.g., high trustors) may be fast to trust, slow to lower trust 
after violation, and fast to trust again, as demonstrated in Figure 1. In contrast, as shown 


































































in Figure 2, other individuals (e.g., high distrustors) may be slow to trust, fast to lower 
trust after violation, and slow to trust again. As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, these 
differences in trust levels and trajectories change across different trust phases. Further, 
these trust patterns are subject to individual differences, situational variables, and 
interactions between the two. The literature on trust restoration has been criticized for its 
overemphasis of violator’s actions and inattention to other factors, such as trustor’s 
disposition (Kim et al., 2009) and situational variables. For example, collectivistic versus 
individualistic self-construal and ingroup/outgroup status has been shown to influence a 
multitude of psychological processes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) 
and is expected to influence how individuals react to violation and change their trust 
across phases. Thus, the third goal of this study was to examine how individual 
differences of trustor, in combination with situational factors related to violation and 
trustee, affect the post-violation trust processes dynamically.  
In sum, to begin to fill the theoretical and empirical gap about effects of violation 
on trust in literature, this study focused on examination of the dynamical nature of trust 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki et al., 2006). Specifically, this research 1) focused on the 
dynamics of trust changes after violation, 2) measured trust continuously across multiple 
phases after violation to reveal these dynamics, and 3) examined the influences of 
individual differences on trust dynamics in conjunction with situational variables. To 
achieve these three goals, this study adopted the paradigm of the Investment Game (IG; 
Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The IG affords collection of repeated measures that 
allow examination of changes in trust levels and trajectories across phases. I applied 
discontinuous growth modeling to analyze these nonlinear trust patterns.  In reviewing 
current literature, no study was found using this paradigm and methodology.  Therefore, 
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this research provides a unique opportunity to understand how violation affects the 
dynamic properties of trust across phases. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
This study builds on the theoretical framework of trust violation, collectivistic 
self-construal, ingroup and outgroup dynamics, and group identification.  In the following 
sections, I review prior research on these four areas.  For each area, I also describe how 
this study reflected the current literature and extends it. 
Trust Violations 
The inclusion of violation in examining trust dynamics is imperative, as to trust is 
to accept future uncertainty and risk (Bohnet, Herrman, & Zeckhauser, in press; Cook et 
al., 2005; Rousseau et al., 1998; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998). In fact, the very 
conditions that foster trust, and the existence of trust itself, allow for malfeasance 
(Granovetter, 1985). A trust violation arises when evidence contradicts one’s positive 
expectations of the trustee, and prompts one to redefine one’s view of the existing 
relationship with the person (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). Trust violations vary 
in their degree; a delay in returning a book is obviously different from embezzling 
company funds. Small transgressions, therefore, should not have the same impact on trust 
changes as large breaches of trust. For example, Tomlinson and colleagues (2004) found 
that the magnitude of a violation moderated the relationship between the estimated 
likelihood of future violations and trust restoration. After a small trust breach, 
participants’ willingness to reconcile is negatively related to probability of future 
violation. In contrast, after a large violation, participants’ willingness to reconcile 
remained low, regardless of how unlikely future violations were. Tomlinson and 
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colleagues (2004) concluded that a large violation was so detrimental to participants’ 
trust that they refused to consider any future interaction with the violator.  
While it is reasonable to expect that a large trust violation will lead to greater trust 
decrease than a small trust violation, a key question is how individual differences and 
situational factors influence the post-violation trust pattern. By simultaneously examining 
the effects of trustor’s collectivistic self-construal and group identification, as well as 
trustee’s group membership and violation magnitude, this research adopted the 
interactionist perspective and is able to situate the findings on trust dynamics in a rich 
context that mirrors the complexity of real world phenomena (Mischel, 1990; Mischel & 
Shoda, 1995).  
Collectivistic Self-Construal  
People have divergent views about the self, others, and the relationship between 
the two (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989). Markus and Kitayama (1991) 
proposed that individual consciousness can focus primarily on the self or the relationships 
one has. Specifically, individuals with an individualistic self-construal endorse “a 
conception of the self as an autonomous, independent person” (p. 226). In contrast, 
individuals with a collectivistic self-construal view “the self and the relationship between 
the self and others . . . not as separate from the social context but as more connected and 
less differentiated from others” (p. 227). Markus and Kitayama (1991) posited that this 
difference is largely determined by individuals’ cultural backgrounds and has influence 
on individual cognition, emotion, and motivation.  
When individuals are high on collectivistic self-construal, their identity is deeply 
connected with others in their social context.  As a result, collectivists have been shown 
to be more helpful and cooperative than individualists in group settings (Moorman & 
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Blakely, 1995; Wagner, 1995).  Individuals high on collectivistic self-construal, 
therefore, may be more tolerant toward trust violations committed by others than those 
low on collectivistic self-construal. However, the resilience of collectivists’ trust should 
not apply to all situations. Because of their close connection with their social 
relationships, it may be more difficult for high collectivists to overlook large violations, 
as compared to small violations.  The damaging effect of a large violation can thus be 
stronger for individuals high rather than low on collectivistic self-construal. In addition to 
violation magnitude, the distinction of ingroup versus outgroup status of trustee is 
particularly relevant to collectivists (Triandis, 1995; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990).  
The effect of a large trust violation on trust changes may be moderated by trustee’s group 
membership.  
Ingroup and Outgroup Dynamics 
Social categorization and identity theories assert that individuals construe their 
identity according to their social context (Taijel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1987). Ingroup 
status exists when people share common group membership, such as belonging to the 
same university; whereas outgroup members refer to those individuals with dissimilar 
group membership. Once an individual’s identity incorporates the group membership, 
individuals tend to exhibit ingroup favoritism, defined as positive perceptions, attitudes, 
and beliefs toward their ingroup and fellow members (Brewer, 1979). Individuals are 
motivated to maintain positive perceptions of their ingroup to maintain high self-esteem 
(Turner, 1987). As a result, when an ingroup member commits a trust violation, 
individuals should be more likely to discount them due to ingroup favoritism and the 
motivation to maintain a positive image of the ingroup members. Furthermore, because of 
the higher level of trustworthiness individuals perceive from an ingroup compared to an 
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outgroup member (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Kramer & Brewer, 1984), trust with an 
ingroup member should be more tolerant toward trust violations and can be restored more 
easily than trust with an outgroup member.  
When individuals are high on collectivistic self-construal, they view themselves 
closely connected with their social context.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that the 
effect predicted by social identity theory, that people will maintain high self-esteem 
through positive perceptions of their ingroup (Taijel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1987), 
would be stronger for high collectivists than low collectivists.  Further, given the 
motivation to maintain high self-esteem and the expectation that ingroup members should 
be highly trustworthy, it would follow that a large trust violation from an ingroup 
member may be more personal to high collectivists than to a large trust violation from an 
outgroup member, particularly in cases when the collectivists identify strongly with their 
group.  
Group Identification  
As discussed in the previous section, trustee’s group membership has an effect on 
individuals’ level of trust, both generally due to social categorization and identity process 
and as an interaction with trustor’s collectivistic self-construal.  This relationship between 
trustee’s group membership and trustor’s collectivistic self-construal should also be 
moderated by the trustor’s level of group identification, as not all groups are personally 
relevant to the trustor.  While one may expect that high identification with a group would 
further bolster collectivists’ trust for others who are also part of the group, this is not 
always the case.  Evidence of a “black sheep effect” (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; 
Marques & Paez, 1994; Khan & Lambert, 1998) has demonstrated that people can be less 
tolerant of ingroup members’ failings and engage in more denigration of ingroup 
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members than of outgroup members with the same shortcomings, particularly when the 
people closely identify with the group (Bègue, 2001; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & 
Coleman, 1993). The combination of trustor’s group identification and collectivistic self-
construal thus can lead to perceptions of a large ingroup trust breach to be even more 
personally relevant, and the individual will attempt to distance the self from the violator 
by considerably decreasing their trust in this ingroup member.  For example, research on 
racial categorization and ingroup polarization—defined as the phenomenon when 
judgments of ingroup members become more extreme such that favorable ingroups are 
perceived more favorably and unfavorable ingroups are perceived more unfavorably 
(Marques, 1990)—has found stronger effects among individuals with strong racial 
identification (Biernat, Vescio, & Billings, 1999). Both racial categorization and 
identification boost individuals’ positive view of their ingroup and, at the same time, 
increase the likelihood that they would denigrate unfavorable ingroup members when this 
positive view is violated (Biernat et al., 1999).  Note that these ingroup and outgroup 
dynamics are prevalent in many social situations, not restricting to racial or ethnic group 
identification.  
 





This study examined the effects of these four factors—violation magnitude, 
collectivistic self-construal, ingroup and outgroup dynamics, and group identification—
on trust dynamics after violation.  Specifically, I focused on trust changes in two phases: 
dissolution and restoration.  Figure 3 illustrates a trust pattern across these phases.  As 
can be seen, trust dissolution refers to the period during and immediately after violations, 
in which trust levels decrease sharply.  Trust restoration occurs after trust dissolution, 
when trust levels stop declining in the absence of further violations, begin increasing, and 
gradually become relatively stable.  Based on the rationale discussed in the previous 
sections, I predicted that the above four factors would jointly affect the post-violation 
trust levels and trajectories in dissolution and restoration.  
In addition, I propose three sets of hypotheses that look at the four-way 
interaction more closely by focusing on specific sets of contrasts.  The first set of 
hypotheses concerns the effects of the trustor’s collectivistic self-construal on trust 
changes after violation.  This set of hypotheses examines whether high collectivists and 
low collectivists react to a large ingroup violation and a small ingroup violation in 
divergent ways.  Specifically, when high collectivists identify strongly with a group, a 
large ingroup violation should threaten the collectivists’ positive image of the ingroup 
and trigger the black sheep effect, which causes them to display a lower level of trust 
during dissolution and restoration than a small ingroup violation.  In addition to 
differences in trust means, high collectivists high on group identification should also 
exhibit a faster rate of trust dissolution and a slower rate of trust restoration after a large 
rather than a small ingroup violation.  A violation from an ingroup member, regardless of 
its magnitude, should not be as relevant to low collectivists as to high collectivists, even 
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when the low collectivists are high on group identification.  Low collectivists, therefore, 
are not expected to react as strongly to a large ingroup violation as high collectivists.  
Therefore, unlike the high collectivists, low collectivists may not exhibit as different trust 
patterns in dissolution and restoration after a large and a small ingroup violation.   
Hypothesis 1a: High collectivists who highly identify with the group and interact 
with an ingroup will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in trust dissolution and a 
smaller and slower in trust restoration after a large than a small violation.  
Hypothesis 1b: By contrast, low collectivists in this condition will exhibit less 
differentiation between a large and a small violation than high collectivists.  
The second set of hypotheses also concerns the effects of trustors’ collectivistic 
self-construal on trust changes after violation.  However, different from the first set of 
hypotheses that focuses on ingroup violations, this second set of hypotheses focuses on 
outgroup violations.  In particular, they examine whether high collectivists and low 
collectivists react to a large outgroup violation and a small outgroup violation differently. 
While ingroup violations are especially relevant to high collectivists high on group 
identification, it is possible that outgroup violations are less meaningful to these high 
collectivists.  Furthermore, high collectivists high on identification may not differentiate 
large and small outgroup violations as much as low collectivists high on identification do.  
For exploratory purposes, this set included an additional hypothesis: low collectivists 
may respond to a large outgroup violation more negatively than a small outgroup 
violation, showing less trust in dissolution and restoration as well as faster dissolution 
and slower restoration.   
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Hypothesis 2a: High collectivists who highly identify with the group and interact 
with an outgroup will exhibit less differentiation between a large and a small 
violation than low collectivists.  
Hypothesis 2b: By contrast, low collectivists in this condition will exhibit a larger 
and faster decrease in trust dissolution and a smaller and slower increase in trust 
restoration after a large than a small violation.  
The final and third set of hypotheses centers on trustor’s group identification and 
examines the responses high collectivists and low collectivists with different levels of 
group identification have toward a large ingroup violation.  This set of analyses will shed 
light on how group identification interacts with collectivistic self-construal.  The first 
hypothesis in this final set directly compares the different responses high collectivists 
high versus low on group identification have toward a large ingroup violation.  The 
combination of high group identification and high collectivistic self-construal should 
intensify the black sheep effect among collectivists toward a large ingroup violation.  
Therefore, after experiencing such a violation, high collectivists high on group 
identification should exhibit a larger and faster decrease during trust dissolution and a 
smaller and slower increase during trust restoration than high collectivists low on group 
identification.  For exploratory purposes, I propose an additional hypothesis within this 
set that focuses on the different responses low collectivists—high versus low on group 
identification—have toward a large ingroup violation.  In particular, low collectivists 
may display the opposite patterns from those of high collectivists.  In the absence of a 
high level of collectivistic self-construal, the shared group membership between the 
trustor and trustee should lead low collectivists high on group identification to tolerate 
and forgive a large ingroup violation better than high collectivists high on group 
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identification.  Low collectivists high on group identification should therefore exhibit a 
smaller and slower decrease during trust dissolution and a larger and faster increase 
during trust restoration than low collectivists low on group identification 
Hypothesis 3a: Among the high collectivists who have experienced a large 
ingroup violation, high identifiers will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in trust 
dissolution and a smaller and slower increase in trust restoration than low 
identifiers. 
Hypothesis 3b: Among the low collectivists who have experienced a large 
ingroup violation, high identifiers will exhibit a smaller and slower decrease in 






Chapter 2. Method 
Design and Participants  
The present study examined how the magnitude of trust violation (small vs. 
large), participants’ collectivistic self-construal (high vs. low), partner’s group 
membership (ingroup vs. outgroup), and participants’ group identification (high vs. low) 
jointly affect the trust levels and trajectories across the dissolution and restoration phases 
after violation. Participants were randomly assigned to the four conditions (two violation 
levels x two partner’s group membership levels) using a double-blind procedure. A total 
of 72 undergraduate students in the University of Maryland participated in the study in 
exchange for course credit. Participants were recruited through an online experiment 
sign-up system available in the university’s psychology department. Among the 
participants, 33% were male and 67% were female. In addition, 61% were White, 8% 
were African American, 6% were Hispanic, 19% were Asian American, and 6% selected 
“other” or declined to answer. The mean age was 19.50 (SD=1.14).  
The Investment Game 
I conducted laboratory experiments using a variant of the Trust Game—the 
Investment Game (IG; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). The IG is ideal for this study 
for a number of reasons. First, the design of IG affords social exchanges that mirror real-
world interactions. Second, the structure of IG allows observation of how violations, 
occurring during a trust relationship, changes individuals’ trust in their partner. Finally, 
an iterated IG (Cochard, Nguygen-Van, & Willinger, 2004) is suitable for examining 
nonlinear trust patterns because it permits repeated measures of trust. In the experimental 





Prior to the present study, a pilot study was conducted to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the computerized IG program, to determine the logistics of the game (e.g., 
the number of rounds needed), and to assess the credibility of the manipulation (i.e., trust 
violation and trustee’s ingroup/outgroup status). Thirty-three undergraduate students in 
the University of Maryland participated in the pilot study in exchange for course credit. 
The trust pattern obtained in the pilot study provided initial support for the present study, 
as trust levels lowered after violations (see Figure 2).  I used the results and feedback 
from participants to determine the final number of rounds in IG, balancing the time per 
round and the total number of rounds necessary to observe the dynamic trust patterns.  
The programmed partner’s response time and the percentages of coins the programmed 
partner keeps during violation were also adjusted.  Finally, participants reported that the 
experimental setting and the game were sufficiently credible.  
Experimental Procedure  
In each experimental session, participants played the IG on computers in 
individual rooms.  Each session typically lasted 30 minutes and included between 2 to 6 
participants.  Upon starting the experiment, participants were informed that they would 
engage in multiple rounds of brief interactions with another participant.  They were 
informed that the experiment was part of a multi-university research initiative and that 
their partner would be a student from either their own university or a different university 
(see Figure 4).  Depending on random assignment, the participants in the ingroup trustee 
condition were assigned a partner from the University of Maryland; while the participants 
in the outgroup trustee condition were assigned a partner from North Carolina State 
University.  North Carolina State University was selected as the outgroup institution 
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based on interviews with four University of Maryland undergraduate students.  These 
students provided a consensus that two universities share similar undergraduate academic 
and sports status, without a strong rivalry between them.  Regardless which partner 
participants were assigned, in actuality, participants played the IG with the computer-
programmed partner.  
 
Figure 4. The welcome screen of the computerized Investment Game.  
Each IG involves two players, a trustor and a trustee.  In this study, all 
participants were assigned to the role of trustor and the computer-programmed partner 
was the trustee.  In the beginning of each round, participants (the trustor) were given 100 
coins and asked to entrust a proportion of the coins, between 0 and100, to their partner 
(the trustee). This decision revealed how much participants trusted the partner.  
The amount participants sent to the partner was then tripled by the program. 
Depending on the pre-programmed responses, the programmed partner sent a portion of 
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the tripled coins back to the participants.  The game constituted of 19 such rounds. The 
first four rounds of the IG were non-violation rounds; the programmed partner returned 
approximately half of the tripled coins with small random variations during each round. 






 rounds, when the programmed partner 
violated participants’ positive expectation by keeping the majority of the tripled coins 
(see Figure 5).   During these three violation rounds, the programmed partner kept 
between 90 and 95 percent of the tripled coins in the large violation condition and 
between 70 and 75 percent of the tripled coins in the small violation condition, depending 
on random assignment.  The exact percentage the programmed partner kept in each round 




 rounds because the timing was 
between early and middle in the game.  Violations occurred in the beginning of a 
relationship can lead to irreversible damage to trust (Lount, Zhong, Sivanathan, & 
Murnighan, 2008).  The three rounds of violations were designed so that participants 
would not perceive the violations as an isolated incident, which they might discount and 
keep trust unaffected (Sitkin & Roth, 1993).  
The remaining rounds, from the 8
th
 to the 19
th
, were non-violation rounds.  The 
programmed partner returned approximately half of the tripled coins with small random 
variations.  At the end of the 19
th
 round, the game stopped.  As knowledge of the end of 
social exchanges tends to decrease cooperation (Murnighan, 1981), participants did not 
know how many rounds remained during the game before the end.  After completing the 
IG, participants filled out a number of questionnaires, including the independent and 
interdependent self-construal scale (Singelis, 1994), a general trust scale (Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi, 1994), and measures on ingroup identification adapted from Doosje, 




Figure 5. The Investment Game screen showing a large trust violation. 
Measures  
Collectivistic self-construal. Twelve items from Singelis’ (1994) independent 
and interdependent self-construal scale measured the degree of participants’ collectivistic 
self-construal. Participants answered the questionnaire on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Sample items were, “I often have the feeling that my 
relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments,” and “It is 
important for me to maintain harmony within my group.” The alpha for this scale was 
.68.  
Group identification. Four questions measured participants’ identification with 
their ingroup—their own university in this study—on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The items were adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears 
(1995): “I identify myself with other students from this university,” “I see myself as a 
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student from this university,” “I am glad to be a student of this university,” and “I feel 
strong ties with students from this university.” The alpha was .78.  
Trust. The behavioral measure of trust constituted the dependent variable in this 
study. It was represented by the number of coins, ranging from 0 to 100, that participants 
allocated to their partner at the beginning of each round during the IG. A total of 19 trust 
measures were collected from each participant.  
General trust. As individuals vary in their propensity to trust, a general trust 
scale (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) was included as a control variable in all analyses. 
Six items measured individuals’ agreement  with statements such as, “Most people are 
basically honest,” and “I am trustful” on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 




Chapter 3. Results 
Data Analysis 
All analyses were conducted in the open-source statistical software environment 
R (R Development Core Team, 2008) and with the nonlinear and linear mixed effect 
model (NLME) package for R (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000).  I employed discontinuous 
growth modeling to analyze the data, following recommendations made by Bliese and 
Ployhart (2002) and Bliese, Wesensten, and Balkin (2006). Because trust violation and 
restoration led to abrupt changes in trust patterns, linear models such as traditional 
growth modeling cannot capture these nonlinear and dynamic properties of the post-
violation trust patterns.  As a newly developed technique, discontinuous growth modeling 
affords researchers opportunities to understand discontinuities within longitudinal data 
and their relationship with individual differences and situational factors (Bliese, Chan, 
Ployhart, 2007; Singer & Willet, 2003).  In this study, a discontinuous growth model was 
able to provide estimates of changes in trust levels and trajectories during the dissolution 
and restoration phases and revealed how these estimates were affected by violation 
magnitude, collectivistic self-construal, ingroup and outgroup dynamics, and group 
identification. 
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the study variables are 










Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrleations of the Study Variables 
 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Violation 0.50 0.50      
2. Partner’s group 
membership 
0.50 0.50 0.00     
3. Collectivistic 
Self-Construal 
4.92 0.65 -0.02 0.03    
4. Group 
Identification 
5.69 0.92 -0.11 0.01 0.40
**
   
5. General Trust 4.59 1.05 -0.09 0.36 0.22 0.19  
Note. N=72.  For violation, 1=large, 0=small; for partner’s group membership, 
1=outgroup, 0=ingroup.  
* p <.05. ** p <.01 
 
After examining the overall trust patterns, three trust phases were identified: 
formation (rounds 1-4), dissolution (rounds 5-9), and restoration (rounds 10-19).  The 
trust phases were determined using a data driven approach, dividing the trust phase based 
on the total number of rounds in the IG and the timing of the violations.  This partition is 
consistent with prior research (Miles & Creed, 1995; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; 
Rousseau et al., 1998).  The trust formation phase occurred at the beginning of the game 
and before violations took place; the dissolution phase consisted of the three violation 
rounds and two rounds immediately afterward. The restoration phase included ten rounds 
after the dissolution phase, in which trust levels began to rise and became gradually 
stable.  To examine changes in both the means and slopes in these phases, my 
discontinuous growth model included five parameters: an overall slope that spanned all 
19 rounds, a dissolution transition, a dissolution slope, a restoration transition, and a 
restoration slope (Singer & Willett, 2003, p. 198).   
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Specifically, a given transition parameter compares the mean level of trust in that 
phase to the mean level of trust in the prior phase.  For example, the dissolution transition 
compares trust means between the dissolution and formation phases, and the restoration 
transition compares trust means between the dissolution and restoration phases. A given 
slope refers to the steepness of a line formed by multiple instances of trust measurement 
within a trust phase.  Compared to an even slope, a steep slope indicates that the multiple 
instances of trust measurement showed more changes.  A steep slope thus signifies a 
faster rate of change than an even slope.  Further, a positive slope indicates that trust 
levels have increased, while a negative slope indicates that trust levels have decreased.   
The model I conducted was a nested, linear mixed-effects model. I set violation 
condition, collectivistic self-construal, group identification, and partner’s group 
membership as fixed effects, while allowing for random variation in intercepts and slopes 
at the individual level. These predictors were entered into the discontinuous growth 
model, similar to moderator variables in normal regression analysis. The model included 
two levels. Level-2, between participants, consisted of experimental manipulation 
(violation condition and partner’s group membership) and individual differences 
(participants’ collectivistic self-construal and group identification). Level-1, within 
participants, consisted of trust measured over time. The model would thus reveal how 
changes in individuals’ trust levels and trajectories are a function of environmental 
factors and personal characteristics. Finally, as individuals’ dispositional propensity to 
trust was significantly correlated with all outcomes, general trust was included as a 





Model Fitting  
To determine the structure of the model, I first conducted a null random 
coefficient model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to estimate the intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC)—differences in trust measures due to individual difference—
conditional of the experimental design (Bliese et al., 2006). The null model included the 
five level-1 parameters that reflect the transitions and slopes across phases, as well as two 
level-2 experimental predictors (violation condition and partner’s group membership). 
The ICC estimated value was 0.68, indicating a moderately high level of trust changes 
were due to individual differences (Bliese, 2000). An examination of the intra-individual 
error structure indicated significant lag 1 serial autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
The model was modified to control for these two conditions. Subsequent model 
comparisons showed that these corrections significantly improved model fit (p<.01).  
Level-2 Effects  
After accounting for lag 1 serial autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the 
model, I examined the effects of the level-2 predictors—including both the experimental 
factors of violation magnitude and partner’s group membership and individual 
differences of participants’ collectivistic self-construal and group identification—on the 
variances in the five transition and slope parameters. The results showed the effect of 
four-way interaction was significant for all of the five parameters: the overall slope (t=-
2.01, p<.05), the dissolution transition (t=2.48, p<.05), the dissolution slope (t=2.77, 
p<.01), the restoration transition (t=2.68, p<.01), and the restoration slope (t=2.11, 
p<.05). Figure 6 shows the dynamic trust patterns across these two trust phases as a 
function of the four level-2 predictors. Because Hypotheses 1-3 focus on the comparisons 
between various cells in Figure 6, a series of contrast analyses that examined trust 
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changes during dissolution and restoration were conducted.  For each hypothesis, results 
for the dissolution transition (the mean differences between formation and dissolution) 
and the dissolution slope are first presented, followed by results for the restoration 
transition (the mean differences between dissolution and restoration) and the restoration 
slope.     
 
Figure 6. The dynamic trust patterns, including formation (rounds 1-4), dissolution 
(rounds 5-9), and restoration (rounds 10-19), as a function of violation magnitude, 
trustors’ collectivistic self-construal, trustors’ group identification, and trustees’ group 
membership. 
Hypotheses Set 1. The first set of hypotheses looks at whether trustors’ levels of 











collectivists, when they are high on group identification, react differently toward an 
ingroup violation than low collectivists who are also high on group identification?  
Hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1a predicts that, because of the black sheep effect, 
high collectivists who are also high identifiers will respond more negatively after a large 
ingroup violation than a small ingroup violation, showing a larger and faster trust 
decrease in dissolution and a smaller and slower trust increase in restoration.  For 
reference, Hypothesis 1a compares the solid lines, representing high collectivists, in Cells 
C (small ingroup violation) and G (large ingroup violation) in Figure 6.  As expected, the 
significant contrast results for the dissolution transition (t=-1.62, p<.05) showed that high 
collectivists high on group identification showed a larger trust decrease in means from 
formation to dissolution after a large than a small ingroup violation (see Figure 7).  In 
addition to the difference in the dissolution transition, high collectivists high on group 
identification also exhibited a faster trust decrease during dissolution after a large than a 
small ingroup violation, as indicated by the significant results for the dissolution slope 




Figure 7. The changes in trust means from formation to dissolution as a function of 
violation magnitude for high collectivists high on group identification after experiencing 
an ingroup violation. 
 
Figure 8. The trust slopes during dissolution as a function of violation magnitude for high 
collectivists high on group identification after experiencing a violation. 
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Further, during trust restoration, high collectivists high on group identification 
also showed a slower trust increase after a large than a small ingroup violation, as 
indicated by the marginal results for the restoration slope (t=-1.80, p<.10; see Figure 9). 
The difference between the mean levels of trust from dissolution to restoration, as 
represented by the restoration transition, was non-significant between a large and a small 
violation. Therefore, as predicted, high collectivists high on group violation responded 
more negatively after a large ingroup violation than a small ingroup violation. Overall, 
Hypothesis 1a—that high collectivists who highly identify with the group and interact 
with an ingroup will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in trust dissolution and a smaller 
and slower in trust restoration after a large than a small violation—was partially 
supported.   
 
Figure 9. The trust slopes during restoration as a function of violation magnitude for high 
collectivists high on group identification after experiencing an ingroup violation. 
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Hypothesis 1b. To compare with Hypothesis 1a, which focuses on high 
collectivists high on group identification, Hypothesis 1b focuses on low collectivists high 
on group identification.  Will low collectivists, when they are high on group 
identification, react differently after an ingroup violation depending on a large versus a 
small violation? Hypothesis 1b predicts that, unlike high collectivists high on group 
identification, low collectivists will not differentiate between a large ingroup violation 
and a small ingroup violation in dissolution and restoration.  Therefore, Hypothesis 1b 
compares the dotted lines, representing low collectivists, in Cells C (small ingroup 
violation) and G (large ingroup violation).  First, the dissolution transition and slope were 
examined.  Supporting Hypothesis1b, the contrast results were non-significant, showing 
that low collectivists did not show differences in the means and slopes during dissolution 
between a large and a small ingroup violation. Unlike high collectivists, low collectivists 
did not differentiate between a large and a small ingroup violation during dissolution.   
However, I found that the restoration transition (t=2.03, p<.05) was significant.  
The results for the restoration transition indicated that the mean levels of trust in 
dissolution and restoration were different after a large and a small violation.  As can be 
seen in Figure 10, low collectivists exhibited a larger increase from dissolution to 
restoration after a large ingroup violation than a small ingroup violation. It is possible 
that, in the absence of a high level of collectivistic self-construal, low collectivists high 
on group identification were able to forgive more after a large than a small violation.  The 
results for the restoration slope were non-significant, indicating low collectivists did not 
show different rates of trust increase during restoration after a large and a small violation. 
Because of the non-significant findings for the dissolution transition, dissolution slope, 
and restoration slope, Hypothesis 1b—that, in contrast with high collectivists, low 
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collectivists will exhibit less differentiation between a large and small violation than high 
collectivists—was largely supported.  
 
Figure 10. The changes in trust means from dissolution to restoration as a function of 
violation magnitude for low collectivists high on group identification after experiencing 
an ingroup violation. 
To further understand how high collectivists and low collectivists, both high on 
group identification, respond to a large ingroup violation, a follow-up analysis was 
conducted.  For reference, the analysis compares the solid line and the dotted line in Cell 
G in Figure 6.  The results for the dissolution transition and slope were non-significant.  
High collectivists and low collectivists high on group identification did not respond to a 
large ingroup violation differently during dissolution.  The results for the restoration 
dissolution were also non-significant.  However, the results for the restoration slope were 
significant (t=-2.16, p<.05), indicating that high collectivists high on group identification 
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exhibited a slower trust increase during restoration than low collectivists high on group 
identification.  
Hypotheses Set 2. The second set of hypotheses concerns how high collectivists 
and low collectivists, both high on group identification, react to a violation from an 
outgroup differently, depending on a large versus a small vioaltion. Instead of focusing 
on the ingroup violation as in Hypotheses 1a and 1b, Hypotheses 2a and 2b focus on trust 
changes after an outgroup violation.  
Hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2a concerns high collectivists who strongly identify 
with the group.  Do these high collectivists respond differently after a large versus a small 
outgroup violation?  Hypothesis 2a predicts that high collectivists high on group 
identification will not differentiate between a large and a small outgroup violation. For 
reference, this contrast analysis examines the difference between the two solid lines, 
representing high collectivists, in Cells D (small outgroup violation) and H (large 
outgroup violation) in Figure 6.  The results for the dissolution transition and slope were 
non-significant, indicating that high collectivists did not demonstrate a difference in their 
trust decrease, whether in levels or slopes, during dissolution after a large outgroup 
violation and a small outgroup violation.  Likewise, the results for the restoration 
transition and the restoration slope were non-significant. These results indicated that high 
collectivists did not differentiate between a large and a small violation in means and 
slopes during dissolution and restoration. Hypothesis 2a—that high collectivists who 
highly identify with the group and interact with an outgroup will exhibit less 
differentiation between a large and a small violation than low collectivists—was 
supported.   
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Hypothesis 2b. While Hypothesis 2a focuses on high collectivists high on group 
identification, Hypothesis 2b focuses on low collectivists high on group identification. 
This analysis was conducted for exploratory purposes. Specifically, Hypothesis 2b 
predicts that these low collectivists will differentiate between a large outgroup violation 
and a small outgroup violation, showing a larger and faster trust decrease in dissolution 
and a smaller and slower trust increase in restoration after a large than a small outgroup 
violation. In Figure 6, Hypothesis 2b compares the dotted lines, representing low 
collectivists, in Cells D (small outgroup violation) and H (large outgroup violation). The 
contrast analysis results for the dissolution transition and slope were non-significant. 
They indicate that low collectivists high on group identification did not react differently 
during dissolution, regardless of a large and a small outgroup violation.  
The results for the restoration transition (t=-2.32, p<.05) and slope (t=-2.04, 
p<.05), however, were significant. As shown in Figure 11, low collectivists high on 
group identification showed a smaller trust increase from dissolution to restoration after a 
large than a small outgroup violation. Likewise, low collectivists high on group 
identification also showed a slower trust increase in restoration after a large than a small 
outgroup violation (see Figure 12). Based on these results, Hypothesis 2b—that, in 
contrast to high collectivists, low collectivists will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in 
trust dissolution and a smaller and slower increase in trust restoration after a large than a 





Figure 11. The changes in trust means from dissolution to restoration as a function of 
violation magnitude for low collectivists high on group identification after experiencing 
an outgroup violation. 
 
Figure 12. The trust slopes during restoration as a function of violation magnitude for 
low collectivists high on group identification after experiencing an outgroup violation. 
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Hypotheses Set 3. The third set of hypotheses shifts gears and focuses on the 
effects of group identification on high and low collectivists. To further understand the 
effects of group identification on trust changes after violation, these two hypotheses 
examine the how trustors’ identification interacts with collectivistic self-construal to 
affect trust dissolution and restoration after a large ingroup violation.  
Before examining Hypotheses 3a and 3b, I first compare trust changes in 
dissolution and restoration for high collectivists low on group identification after a large 
and a small ingroup violation.  This analysis differs from Hypotheses 1a in that it focuses 
on individuals low on group identification instead of high on group identification.  It is 
possible that high collectivists low on group identification will respond more strongly 
after a large than a small ingroup violation. In particular, these individuals may exhibit 
little trust change after a small ingroup violation.  Therefore, after a large ingroup 
violation, high collectivists low on group identification will display a larger and faster 
decrease in trust dissolution than a small ingroup violation; however, they would also 
exhibit a larger and faster increase in trust restoration after a large than a small violation 
due to the lack of trust dissolution after a small violation.  For reference, in Figure 6, this 
contrast analysis compares the solid lines, representing high collectivists, in Cells A 
(small ingroup violation) and E (large ingroup violation).  The results for the dissolution 
transition were non-significant, indicating that high collectivists low on group 
identification did not exhibit different mean levels of trust from formation to dissolution 
after a large and a small ingroup violation.  However, the results for the dissolution slope 
were significant (t=-2.15, p<.05), indicating that high collectivists low on group 
identification showed a faster trust decrease during dissolution after a large than a small 




Figure 13. The trust slopes during dissolution as a function of violation magnitude for 
high collectivists low on group identification after experiencing an ingroup violation. 
 
Figure 14. The changes in trust means from dissolution to restoration as a function of 
violation magnitude for high collectivists low on group identification after experiencing 
an ingroup violation. 
35 
 
The results for the restoration transition (t=2.82, p<.01) and slope (t=4.28, 
p<.001) were also significant. As can be seen in Figure 14, high collectivists low on 
group identification showed a larger trust increase from dissolution to restoration after a 
large than a small ingroup violation. In addition, Figure 15 shows that high collectivists 
low on group identification also showed a faster trust increase during restoration after a 
large than a small ingroup violation. These results, compared to those for Hypothesis 1a, 
suggest that high collectivists high and low on group identification were equally affected 
by a large ingroup violation. However, high collectivists low on group identification were 
able to restore trust, while high collectivists high on group identification continued to 
show a black sheep effect and were unable to restore trust.   
  
Figure 15. The trust slopes during restoration as a function of violation magnitude for 
high collectivists low on group identification after experiencing an ingroup violation. 
Hypothesis 3a. Does a high level of group identification, in combination with a 
high level of collectivistic self-construal, exacerbate the black sheep effect for 
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collectivists after a large ingroup violation?  Hypothesis 3a focuses on the trust changes 
of high collectivists high versus low on identification after a large ingroup violation.  It 
examined whether a high level of group identification would lead to a black sheep effect 
on trust changes during dissolution and restoration among high collectivists.  It predicts 
that, after a large ingroup violation, high collectivist high on group identification will 
exhibit a larger and faster trust decrease in dissolution and a smaller and slower trust 
increase in restoration than high collectivists low on group identification.  For reference, 
this hypothesis compares the solid lines, representing high collectivists, in Cells E (large 
ingroup violation for low identifiers) and G (large ingroup violation for identifiers). 
Results for the dissolution transition and the dissolution slope were non-significant, 
indicating that, during dissolution when the large ingroup violation has just occurred, 
high collectivists high and low on group identification did not respond to the violation 
differently in means and slopes.   
Results for the restoration transition were also non-significant. High collectivists 
did not show a smaller increase from dissolution to restoration when they have high 
rather than low group identification.  However, the results for the restoration slope (t=-
2.57, p<.01) were significant. As Figure 16 displays, high collectivists exhibited a faster 
trust increase during restoration when they are low rather than high group identification. 
Hypothesis 3a—that, among the high collectivists who have experienced a large violation 
from an ingroup, high identifiers will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in trust 
dissolution and a smaller and slower increase in trust restoration than low identifiers—




Figure 16. The trust slopes during restoration as a function of trustors’ group 
identification for high collectivists after experiencing a large ingroup violation. 
Hypothesis 3b. In contrast to Hypothesis 3a, which focuses on high collectivists, 
Hypothesis 3b focuses on low collectivists after a large ingroup violation. This analysis 
was conducted for exploratory purposes. While low collectivists tend not to differentiate 
between a large and a small ingroup violation, their levels of group identification may 
affect how they respond to these violations. Hypothesis 3b predicts that low collectivists 
low on group identification would exhibit a larger and faster trust decrease in dissolution 
and a smaller and slower trust increase in restoration after a large ingroup violation. This 
hypothesis thus compares the dotted lines, representing low collectivists, in Cells E (large 
ingroup violation for low identifiers) and G (large ingroup violation for high identifiers). 
However, the results for the dissolution transition and the dissolution slope were non-
significant.  Low collectivists high and low on group identification did not respond to a 




Figure 17. The changes in trust means from dissolution to restoration as a function of 
trustors’ group identification for low collectivists after experiencing a large ingroup 
violation. 
Results for the restoration transition (t=1.74, p<.10) and slope (t=1.88, p<.10), on 
the other hand, suggesting a trend. Compared to low collectivists low on group 
identification, low collectivists high on group identification showed a larger trust increase 
from dissolution to restoration (see Figure 17), and a faster trust increase during 
restoration (see Figure 18).  Hypothesis 3b—that, among the low collectivists who have 
experienced a large violation from an ingroup, high identifiers will exhibit a smaller and 
slower decrease in trust dissolution and a larger and faster increase in trust restoration 
than low identifiers—was partially supported.  Furthermore, an examination of the results 
for Hypotheses 3a and 3b indicates that the difference in responses toward a large 
ingroup violation between trustors high and low on group identification was more 





effect of trustors’ group identification became progressively stronger as the trust 
interactions continued.                                                                                                                  
 
Figure 18. The trust slopes during restoration as a function of trustors’ group 




Chapter 4. General Discussion 
Prior studies have conceptualized the trust process to consist of multiple distinct 
phases (Miles & Creed, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). At the same time, researchers have 
noted the prevalence of trust violations (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Morris & Moberg, 
1994). In this study, I examined trust levels and trajectories in two post-violation trust 
phases: dissolution and restoration. Adopting the longitudinal approach, I was able to 
address erroneous theoretical assumptions (i.e., trust is static and linear) and inadequate 
methodology (i.e. a single measurement of trust) in some of the prior research. In 
addition, I investigated whether individual differences interacted with situational factors 
in affecting the trust dynamics across these phases. Results from the discontinuous 
growth modeling revealed a significant four-way interactive effect among violation 
magnitude, collectivistic self-construal, group identification, and partner’s group 
membership on the post-violation trust means and slopes in trust dissolution and 
restoration.    
Specifically, I found that collectivistic trustors display divergent patterns after a 
violation depending on the magnitude of trust violation, trustee’s group membership and 
the trustors’ own group identification.  Hypothesis 1a predicts that high collectivists who 
highly identify with the group and interact with an ingroup will respond more negatively 
after a large than a small violation.  Indeed, high collectivists high on group violation 
showed a larger and faster decrease in dissolution and a slower increase in restoration 
after a large than a small violation, indicating that the large ingroup violation triggered 
the black sheep effect while the small ingroup violation did not.  Further, Hypothesis 1b 
predicts that, in contrast with high collectivists, low collectivists will exhibit less 
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differentiation between a large and a small ingroup violation than high collectivists. The 
results showed that low collectivists were less sensitive to an ingroup violation, and for 
the most part, did not differentiate between a large and small ingroup violation during 
dissolution and restoration.  
In addition to the responses high and low collectivists have toward an ingroup 
violation, I also examine the responses high and low collectivists have toward an 
outgroup violation. Hypothesis 2a predicts that high collectivists who highly identify with 
the group and interact with an outgroup will not differentiate between a large and small 
violation.  The non-significant results for the transitions and slopes during dissolution and 
restoration supported this hypothesis.  Like low collectivists after an ingroup violation, 
high collectivists high on group identification did not differentiate between a small and a 
large violation if it is from an outgroup. In contrast, low collectivists high on group 
identification were sensitive toward outgroup violations.  For exploratory purposes, 
Hypothesis 2b predicts that low collectivists will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in 
trust dissolution and a smaller and slower increase in trust restoration after a large than a 
small violation. I found that while they did not differentiate a large and a small violation 
during dissolution, they exhibited a smaller and slower trust increase after a large than a 
small violation. These results suggest that low collectivists could be affected by a large 
outgroup violation more than high collectivists.  
Moreover, I also examined how trustors’ group identification interacts with their 
levels of collectivistic self-construal to affect their trust after violation. Hypothesis 3a 
predicts that, among the high collectivists who have experienced a large violation from an 
ingroup, high identifiers will exhibit a larger and faster decrease in trust dissolution and a 
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smaller and slower increase in trust restoration than low identifiers. Results showed that, 
during dissolution when a large ingroup violation has just occurred, high collectivists 
high on group identification did not react to the violation differently from high 
collectivists low on group identification.  However, during dissolution, the two groups of 
trustors displayed divergent patterns.  High collectivists high on group identification 
showed a small and slow trust increase in restoration, whereas high collectivists low on 
group identification showed a large and fast trust increase. These results suggest that the 
combination of high levels of collectivistic self-construal and group identification leads 
to the black sheep effect. As a result, high collectivists high on group identification 
exhibited low tolerance toward large ingroup violations and engaging in negative trust 
behaviors toward the ingroup member. 
For exploratory purposes, I also looked at whether low collectivists high and low 
on group identification react to a large ingroup violation differently. Hypothesis 3b 
predicts that, among the low collectivists who have experienced a large violation from an 
ingroup, high identifiers will exhibit a smaller and slower decrease in trust dissolution 
and a larger and faster increase in trust restoration than low identifiers.  I found that, 
during dissolution, low collectivists high and low on group identification did not react 
differently after a large ingroup violation.  However, there was a trend that low 
collectivists high on group identification were more forgiving during trust restoration 
than low collectivists low on group identification.  These findings—that the differences 
between high and low identifiers were absent in dissolution but present in restoration—
suggest the possibility that the impact of trustors’ group identification may not take effect 
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immediately after a violation. Consequently, the black sheep effect for high collectivists 
high on group identification may grow stronger over time after a violation. 
The contributions of this study are three-fold.  First, in response to concerns about 
limited research on post-violation trust (e.g., Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007), the 
present research focused on dynamic trust patterns after violations. Second, this study 
was among the first to examine multiple trust phases sequentially. The findings support 
the notion that trust is dynamic, as suggested by other scholars in the field (Rousseau et 
al., 1998). By focusing on the nonlinear and dynamic changes of trust across multiple 
phases, I sought to provide a more holistic picture of this important phenomenon. Finally, 
this study included both the individual difference of self-construal and group 
identification and the situational variables of violation magnitude and partner’s group 
membership as antecedents of trust changes after violation.  
Limitations 
 Despite these findings, the present study is not without limitations.  I examined 
trust processes in an experimental setting, instead of real world exchanges.  As one of the 
first few studies that use an economic game to examine trust dynamics, however, 
laboratory experiments such as the one conducted in the present study have important 
values in that they provide researchers with a controlled environment.  Further, research 
on game theory has proven experimental games effective in studying economic theories 
(Nash, 1950) and demonstrating generalizable phenomena, such as the boundary 
conditions for individual rationality and interpersonal interactions (e.g. Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser, 2004; Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, & Wood, 2010). 
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 In addition, the present study measured participants’ levels of collectivistic self-
construal and group identification. The current results can be further strengthened if the 
study had experimentally manipulated these two predictors.  Finally, this study targeted 
specific sets of contrasts based on theoretical consideration.  Therefore, not all possible 
comparisons among the eight cells in Figure 6 were examined.  For instance, the contrast 
between trust changes of low and high collectivists high on group identification after a 
large outgroup violation were not theoretically relevant to the present study and was 
excluded.  
Future Research Directions 
Because of this study’s use of laboratory experiment, replications of the present 
findings in a field study are needed.  Further, the illuminating results on the joint effects 
of trust violation, collectivistic self-construal, ingroup and outgroup dynamics, and group 
identification suggest that researchers need to take both individual and situational factors 
into account to explore fully the complexity of trust relationships.  Additional trust 
research that uses similar approaches and methodologies to examine other contextual 
factors is warranted.  In particular, research should examine different outgroups that span 
a range of social distance from an ingroup.  The ingroup and outgroup in the present 
study may have a relatively small social distance, which can lead to different trust 
patterns compared to an ingroup and outgroup with a large social distance.  It would be 
interesting to examine how a large social distance elicits strong motivational and 
emotional reactions from the trustors and affects their trust changes after violation.  
Future research could also examine additional situational factors, such as time pressure 
and public versus private situation.  Research should also use the paradigm to examine 
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other individual difference factors, such as need for closure, locomotion/assessment, and 
other personality variables, to predict the dynamical nature of trust.  Prior research has 
highlighted the importance to understand individuals’ characteristics that influence their 
propensity to trust formation and restoration (Kim et al., 2009). 
The present research focused on the effects of violation on trust.  An extension is 
to examine the effects of different post-violation strategies that a violator can employ on 
trust changes.  For example, how do admission, apologies, and denial affect the dynamic 
trust patterns after violation?  As a number of studies have identified both successful and 
unsuccessful trust repair tactics (e.g., Kim et al., 2006; McCullough et al., 1997), it would 
be fruitful to examine the effects of these tactics on differences in trust levels and 
trajectories during trust restoration.  
Moreover, future research needs to examine the effect of culture on dynamic trust 
processes.  This study included the individual variable of collectivistic self-construal, a 
construct that is largely influenced by individuals’ cultural backgrounds.  Markus and 
Kitayama (1991) suggest that collectivists are common in many Asian countries, while 
individualists are common in Europe and the U.S.  Results on the collectivists’ complex 
trust behavior from cross-cultural studies can potentially yield insight for international 
collaboration and negotiation.  As our global interdependence grows, interpersonal and 
institutional relations frequently cross national and cultural boundaries.  However, there 
are surprisingly few empirical studies on trust in relation to culture (Schoorman et al., 
2007; for notable exceptions, see Bohnet, Herrman, & Zeckhauser, in press; Yamagishi et 
al., 1998).  Understanding how culture affects trust is critical.  It is unlikely that the trust 
process is universal, especially when many fundamental psychological phenomena have 
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been shown to exhibit cultural specificity (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Both trust and 
culture are increasingly important in determining our societal well-being.  A dynamical 
approach to trust formation and restoration, combined with rigorous and appropriate 
methodology, should provide scientists better understanding of this important construct 
and make an impact on our field and our global community. 
Conclusion 
In his book Bowling Alone, Putnam (2000) proposes that trust in government and 
economy is a bottom-up process that begins with trust relationships we form with one 
another in everyday life. Fukuyama (1995) similarly contends that trust in fundamentally 
interpersonal. With the recent poll by the Pew Research Center (2010) showing that 
Americans’ trust in government is at a historic low and a long string of highly publicized 
failures in Wall Street, it is more urgent than ever to understand how violation affects the 
dynamic patterns of interpersonal trust relationships.   
The present study uses the iterated investment game and discontinuous growth 
modeling to examine the effect of violation on trust changes across two trust phases: 
dissolution and restoration. Trust scholars have long called for a dynamical approach that 
encompasses multiple trust stages and measures trust patterns over time (Rousseau, et al., 
1998; Lewicki et al., 2006). This research expands the current trust literature by 
examining how the interaction among trust violation, collectivistic self-construal, ingroup 
and outgroup dynamics, and group identification affects trust dynamics after violation. 
By focusing on the volatile and nonlinear changes of trust over time, I hope to provide a 
more holistic picture of this important phenomenon and generate a new wave of research 
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